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A new general anti-abuse rule (GAAR) has been adopted as part of the Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Directive of 12 July 2016 (ATAD), and will likely have worldwide implications regarding the 
way companies operate and structure their businesses.  
 
This dissertation intends to expose and develop the relationship between this new GAARs’ 
treatment of abuse and the one forged by the European Court of Justice throughout the years. 
Throughout this endeavor several questions are raised about abuse, its prevention, the 
methods used and their efficiency. Thus, first this study sets out to highlight the difficulties of 
interpreting the concept of abuse of (tax) law, as well as the doctrine that was built around 
it throughout the years. Subsequently it exposes the role of abuse (and measures taken to 
prevent it) within the European Union legal order, as well as those based on the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice – further detailing the onus regarding the 
burden of proof. Finally, part III establishes a recent trend towards mandatory GAAR 
codification by exposing the traditional approach taken up until this point, as well as a 
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A State’s power to tax comes from the notion that, as one can imagine, governmental 
authority is inconceivable without the existence of public funds. Thus, this power is not an 
end in itself, but a means to ensure the sovereignty of the State - both domestically and 
internationally - by asserting the means to protect its people and itself. 
This limitation of the Member State’s national power of taxation was imposed by the 
fundamental freedoms and non-discrimination clauses determined in the Treaty that 
established the European Community1 and, albeit it was not without grievances, an 
understanding over limits to this restriction is slowly being created through several rulings. 
In line with the Schumacker2 ruling, the ECJ established - in rulings such as Verder 
LabTec3 - that: 
“(…) it should be borne in mind, first, that the preservation of the balanced 
allocation of powers of taxation between Member States is a legitimate objective 
recognized by the Court, and that, in the absence of any unifying or harmonizing 
measures of the European Union, the Member States retain the power to define, by 
treaty or unilaterally, the criteria for allocating their powers of taxation, with a view 
to eliminating double taxation”. 
In the Brisal4 ruling the Court also expanded on the fact that in some cases, the restriction 
to fundamental freedoms may be justified for reasons of public interest, such as that of 
effective tax collection – as long as the aim pursued does not go beyond what is necessary 
for that purpose. 
Other traditionally accepted justifications include the prevention of tax fraud and 
evasion, ensuring the effectiveness of fiscal supervision5, as well as maintaining the 
                                       
1 Treaty 2002/C 325/01. 
2 ECJ, Schumacker, C-279/93, 14 February 1995, §§ 21 and 24. 
3 ECJ, Verder LabTec, C-657/13, 21 May 2015 §32. 
4 ECJ, Brisal, Case C‑18/15, 13 July 2016, §39. See also ECJ, FKP Scorpio Konzertproduktionen, 
C‑290/04, 3 October 2006, §§ 35 – 36. 
5 i.e. ECJ Baxter and Others, C-254/97. 
7 
coherence of the fiscal system6. In fact, this remains an important topic given that direct 
taxation is still an essential pillar of Member States’ power of purse.  
In any case, seeing as companies are rational economic agents, they will perform their 
actions with the optimal expected outcome in mind. Thus, they choose structures that limit 
their exposure to taxes – which, seen from an accounting perspective, represents a cost like 
any other.  
In this globalized world, faced with a non-harmonized system and with imperfect laws7, 
it is nearly impossible to avoid that companies try to mitigate their tax burden through tax 
planning. The problem, however, emerges when the line is crossed into tax evasion, and 
abuse.  
Though the prevention of these practices has been frequently encouraged and recognized 
as an objective, both by Article 13 (B) of the Sixth Directive and by the ECJ, the phenomenon 
of tax-evasion is familiar to all tax systems. In fact, legal definitions of these terms – where 
they exist – are so different from State to State, that it is necessary to discover the structural 
and functional elements of tax abuse and to individualize the principles common to the 
various legal traditions in order to define this abuse and prevent it 
Considering the above, and the alterations the ATAD may bring, this dissertation seeks 
to answer the question of whether the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive’s General Anti-Abuse 
Rule is in line with the ECJ case law. 
In order to properly develop this topic and its underlying questions, this dissertation will 
be composed of three main parts: 
The first part will develop the issue regarding the different concepts of abuse, which 
include the problems linked to the interpretation of International / European provisions in 
general, as well as the doctrine of abuse that was slowly forged throughout the years. 
                                       
6 i.e. ECJ, Bachmann, C-204/90; ECJ, Commission v. Belgium, C-300/90. 
7 Which is partly due to the fact that big businesses became global enterprises whereas tax authorities 
continued to operate through national frameworks, never grasping the global picture. It was only after the 
banking crisis in the United States of America that some of these operations were exposed as 
fundamentally unfair. 
8 
The second part specifically focuses on the abuse of tax law within the European Union, 
diving into the different measures taken to prevent tax evasion both from the European 
institutions (within the legal system) and by the ECJ, focusing also on the issue regarding the 
burden of proof. 
Lastly, in our third part, we will analyze the general anti-abuse rules in their traditional 
approaches (up until now) and the novelty of the ATAD’s GAAR, diving further into the 
legal consequences of non-compliance. 
 
I - Different Concepts of Abuse 
 
1.  Problems of interpretation 
 
Since the ECJ operates in a multi-language contest, the rules have to be translated in 
over 20 different national idioms8. This linguistic issue represents a complex problem, which 
should be analyzed from different points of view9. 
Though the definitions are not harmonized, - varying from country to country10, and even 
from author to author11 - the starting point is necessarily the recognition that there are several 
ways to reduce someone’s (or somethings’) tax liability. Among these acts, some are intra-
legem, some are extra-legem, and some live in limbo. 
                                       
8 Here we use the term “Idioms” instead of “languages”, because though some Member States share the 
same official language, the discrepancy in expressions is enormous. 
9 As was articulated by ANDREJ GLEZL in his article Lost in Translation: EU Law and the Official 
languages – Problem of the Authentic Text, Centre for European Legal Studies, University of Cambridge, 
2007, pp. 1-11: “In Anglo-Saxon countries tax avoidance is different from tax evasion. In France and in 
Belgium, tax avoidance is évasion, while tax evasion is fraude fiscal. However, Tax evasion is the Spanish 
evasión fiscal and the Portuguese evasão fiscal; while tax avoidance is respectively elusion fiscal and 
elisão fiscal”. 
10 Which some authors recognize as political compromises in the use of vague terms, as seen BENES, Jan. 
Translation of Terminology in EU Legislative Texts, Bachelor’s Diploma Thesis, Masaryk University, 
2008, p. 1.  
11 As recognized early on by Portuguese professor SÁ GOMES, NUNO, Lições de Direito Fiscal, volume 
2, Lisboa: FDUL, 1984, pp. 143 et seq. 
9 
Tax planning, the most known of these institutes, has several possible definitions. 
However, unable to explain (or expand on) all of them at the moment, in this dissertation we 
have sided with Portuguese Professor SALDANHA SANCHES’12 doctrine regarding this 
particular act: [Free translation] “tax planning consists on a tax reduction technique by which 
either the taxpayer avoids a certain behavior seeing as it is associated with an undesired tax 
liability, or he chooses, among several options provided by the legal order the one which, 
through intentional action or through the legislator’s omission, offers the less tax burdens”. 
This is seen by the author as the exercise of an economic freedom (incumbent to all taxpayers) 
but subject to restrictions.  
Tax avoidance, on the other hand, (also known as “aggressive tax planning”) consists on 
bypassing the law without directly infringing it – fraus legis. It implies using the law to obtain 
a tax advantage that the government never intended (but merely did not foresee) so as to 
minimize the (taxpayers’) tax burden13. Considering the economic globalization that has 
expanded in the last century, it is important to note that in cross-border situations, tax 
avoidance is made possible by the regulatory competition that exists among national tax 
systems. Given that the power to levy taxes remains with the Member States, the latter are 
allowed to “organize, in compliance with Community law, its system of taxation of distributed 
profits and, in that context, (…) define the tax base, as well at the tax rates which apply to 
the company making the distribution and/or the shareholder to whom the dividends are paid, 
in so far as they are liable to tax in that State”, as stated in the ECJ’s ruling Test Claimants 
in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation14. 
As explained by Professor KOEN LAENARTS15:  
                                       
12 SANCHES, SALDANHA, “Os limites do planeamento fiscal, Substância e forma no Direito fiscal 
português, comunitário e internacional”, Coimbra, Coimbra Editora, p. 21: “O planeamento fiscal 
consiste numa técnica de redução da carga fiscal pela qual o sujeito passivo renuncia a um certo 
comportamento por este estar ligado a uma obrigação tributária ou escolhe, entre as várias soluções que 
lhe são proporcionadas pelo ordenamento jurídico, aquela que, por acção intencional ou omissão do 
legislador fiscal, está acompanhada de menos encargos fiscais”. 
13 It usually involves artificial arrangements that serve no other purpose than to reduce the tax liability of 
the Company – but is in compliance with the law. 
14 ECJ, Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation, Case C-374/04, § 50. See also ECJ Test 
Claimants in the FII Group Litigation C-446/04, §47. 
15 In LENAERTS, KOEN. The Concept of ‘Abuse of Law’ in the case law of the European Court of Justice 
on direct taxation, Maastricht journal of European and comparative law (MJ), 2015, p. 330. 
10 
“As Member States apply different income and corporation taxes, a natural (or 
legal) person may decide to exercise an economic activity in a Member State other 
than his of her (or its) state of residence so as to profit from tax advantages”. 
Furthermore, as stated several times in ECJ case law16: “[An EU] national cannot be 
deprived of the right to rely on the provisions of the treaty on the grounds that he is profiting 
from tax advantages which as legally provided by the rules in force in a Member State other 
than his state of residence”. 
However, it is also clear that an EU national must not attempt to undermine the 
effectiveness of a Member State’s tax system by circumventing their national legislation to 
fraudulently benefit from EU laws. In fact, this notion was clearly stated in Centros17, and 
reinforced in several others ever since18.  
It is important to highlight that this is different from what we call tax planning, since 
trying to pay minimal tax is not necessarily a sign of avoidance. 
Furthermore, tax avoidance is different from tax evasion, as the latter is the criminal 
practice of using illegal methods to avoid paying taxes. In fact, tax evasion is usually 
considered a subset of tax fraud, which occurs when an individual (or business) wilfully and 
intentionally falsifies information in order to limit the amount of tax liability.  
Tax fraud essentially entails cheating on a tax return in an attempt to avoid paying the 
entire tax obligation. Examples of tax fraud include claiming false deductions; claiming 
personal expenses as business expenses; and not reporting income.  
                                       
16 Among others, ECJ, Barbier C-364/01, §71. 
17 ECJ, Centros, C-212/97, 9 March 1999, § 24. 
18 See, in particular, regarding freedom to supply services, ECJ, Van Binsbergen v Bedrijfsvereniging 
Metaalnijverheid, C-33/74, 1974, § 13, ECJ, Veronica Omroep Organisatie v Commissariaat voor de 
Media, C-148/91, 1993, § 12, and ECJ, TV 10 v Commissariaat voor de Media, C-23/93, 1994, § 21; 
regarding freedom of establishment, ECJ, Knoors, C-115/78, 1979, § 25, and ECJ, Bouchoucha, C-61/89 
1990, § 14; regarding the free movement of goods, ECJ, Leclerc and Others v 'Au Blé Vert' and Others, 
C-229/83, 1985, § 27; regarding social security, ECJ, Brennet v Paletta, C-206/94, 1996; regarding 
freedom of movement for workers, ECJ, Lair v Universität Hannover, C-39/86, 1988, § 43; regarding the 
common agricultural policy, ECJ, General Milk Products v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas, C-8/92, 1993 
§ 21; and regarding company law, ECJ, Kefalas and Others v Greece, C-367/96, 1998, § 20. 
11 
Tax evasion, though related, is usually more complex than tax fraud and it was to define 
it that the ECJ developed the notion of “abuse of law”19. 
Abuse, for its part - even in its most colloquial use - refers to the improper use of 
something. Just as well, what is called tax abuse, is nothing but the improper use of tax law20.  
Furthermore, an important distinction must be made between: 
Abuse of Law, which indicates abuse in Community law: the object of abuse is a norma 
agenda belonging to a national fiscal system, which the taxpayer circumvents through a 
mistreatment of Treaty dispositions21; and Abuse of Rights22, which for its part, indicates 
abuse of Community law: the object of abuse is a facultas agendi provided by a Community 
Directive.  
“In rough terms the abuse of law is characterized by the misuse of provisions or 
rules either of the domestic or international systems to achieve improper benefits 
i.e. the use of those provisions or rules in a way that is not fully adherent with the 
rationale behind them. In this sense, the progressive evolution of the concept of 
abuse is a reaction against the absolute character of the statutory rights (and in 
particular, of the rights of property) during the later Empire Roman era23”. 
 
 Albeit the above, abuse is still a fragmented term that carries different meanings for 
different authors. In fact, authors like KIEKEBELD have proposed a unique notion of “tax 
                                       
19 DE LA FERIA, R., VOGENAUER, S. Prohibition of abuse of (community) law: a New General 
Principle of EU Law?, Oxford, Hart publishing, 2011. 
20 Such as tax evasion. 
21 It is, for instance, when a person seeks to rely on a European legal right to circumvent or displace 
national law. 
22 The ECJ recognizes the full and proper construction of the European right upon which a person wishes 
to rely, but prevents to utilize in any event. An example of this is when a person seeks to take advantage 
of a right in European law, but in a manner running against its spirit. 
23 BIZIOLI, GIANLUIGI, Taking EU Fundamental Freedoms seriously: Does the Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Directive take precedence over the single market?, EC tax review, (2017-3) pp.170, where he also 
mentions in footnote 17 that: “in this sense, the progressive evolution of the concept of abuse of law is a 
reaction against absolute character of the statutory rights (and, in particular, of the right of property) during 
the later Empire Roman era. ‘(…) it is in the same interest of the owner not to refuse help in case a slave 
is maintained in a condition of starvation, famine or subject to disproportionate work’.”. 
12 
avoidance”24 (which we refer to in this dissertation as evasion), but not having been adopted, 
intermediate approaches have had more success, such as that argued by VANISTENDAEL25, 
which, after having compared the Halifax and Cadbury Schweppes rulings, concludes that 
both decisions have an identical “reasoning” if only different perspectives. The author notes 
that one of the biggest differences between the two rulings is that in Halifax the Court leaves 
some leeway for the national tax authorities to establish whether the tax motive is “essential” 
or not, whereas in Cadbury Schweppes the ECJ categorically determines that when the cross-
border economic reality of the transactions are established, there can be no tax avoidance 
[evasion] and the goal of achieving a tax advantage has no importance.  
Some other authors, for their part, even believe that the prohibition of abuse is a full and 
true principle26. 
Now that we have exposed the main problems of interpretation, as well as defined the 
terms that will henceforth be used in this dissertation, we will now provide a brief account 
on the evolution of the doctrine of abuse. 
 
2. The Doctrine of Abuse 
 
The doctrine built around the abuse of rights, found in different measures in the Civil 
Law jurisdictions, refers to the malicious or antisocial exercise of otherwise legitimate rights, 
which in certain situations can give rise to civil liability27. 
                                       
24 As seen in NOGUEIRA, JOÃO FÉLIX PINTO, Abuso de Direito em Fiscalidade Directa – a emergência 
de um novo operador jurisprudencial comunitário, Revista da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade do 
Porto, Coimbra Editora, Coimbra, 2009, p. 280. 
25 VANISTENDAEL, FRANS, Halifax and Cadbury Schweppes; one single European theory of abuse in 
tax law?, EC Tax Review, n.º 4, 2006, p.195. 
26 MARTÍN JIMENEZ, A. Towards a homogeneous Theory of Abuse in (Direct) Tax Law, IBDF, Bulletin 
for International Taxation, April/May 2012 pp. 270-292. 
27 REID, ELSPETH, The doctrine of abuse of rights: Perspective from a Mixed Jurisdiction, Electronic 
Journal of Comparative Law, volume 8 n.º 3, October 2004, p. 1. 
13 
The doctrine of abuse was not originally defined by the ECJ, but slowly came into 
existence in certain passages, such as in Van Binsbergen28, Kefalas29 and Centros30.  
Specifically, the ECJ established in Van Binsbergen that: 
“a Member State cannot be denied the right to take measures to prevent the exercise 
by a person providing services whose activity is entirely or principally directed 
towards its territory of the freedom guaranteed by article [56 TFEU] for the purpose 
of avoiding the professional rules of conduct which would be applicable to him if he 
were established within that state31”.  
The ECJ later made clear that this line of reasoning did not imply that Member States 
had a free pass to indiscriminately (and unjustifiably) apply their own national anti-abuse 
provisions. 
However, as hinted above, what is considered abusive by some may not be 
acknowledged by others, which is why scholars have not yet been able to answer the question 
of whether we can speak of just one concept of abuse in tax law according to the ECJ’s case 
law.32 
In fact, what is considered evasion in one country may be considered legitimate tax 
planning in another (as certain behaviors may approach fraud in northern countries and yet 
be acceptable in southern countries without much of a fuss). As Professor JOÃO FELIX 
NOGUEIRA, Portuguese scholar, has noted33, this poses serious threats to the internal market34. 
Albeit the fundamental freedoms are ensured, an individual that conducts business in several 
Member States may see his activity labeled as fraudulent in one of them if that State adopts 
a wider definition of abuse.  
                                       
28 ECJ, Van Binsbergen, C-33/74, 3 December 1974. 
29 ECJ, Kefalas, C-367/96, 12 May 1998, §21-22. 
30 ECJ, Centros, C-212/97, 9 March 1999, §27. 
31 ECJ, Van Binsbergen, C-33/74, 3 December 1974, §47. 
32 PIANTAVIGNA, PAOLO, Tax Abuse in the European Union Law: a Theory, EC Tax review, 2011-3, 
p. 145. See also AG Poiares Maduro’s Opinion on the Halifax ruling §71. 
33 See NOGUEIRA, JOÃO FÉLIX PINTO, Abuso de Direito em Fiscalidade Directa – a emergência de um 
novo operador jurisprudencial comunitário, Revista da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade do Porto, 
Coimbra Editora, Coimbra, 2009. 
34 Seen as a borderless space in which free circulation of goods, services, and capital are ensured. 
14 
In an attempt to harmonize said practices, the ECJ has been gradually adopting a notion 
of “abuse” related to its own concrete case-law and, through the progressive generalization 
of its formulas, has forged a real general doctrine of abuse. Hence, through the ECJ’s way of 
thinking and re-thinking its modus operandi, we can infer the existence of a guideline. 
However, by using some of these expressions in an interchangeable way, the ECJ makes 
the concept of abuse far from being clear35. As stated by Professor Pasquale Pistone36:  
“There is a long way to go to achieve a common understanding of abusive practices 
for the purposes of European tax law, as well as to ascertain what exactly should 
be regarded as artificial arrangements, what relations exists for European law 
between abuse and respectively avoidance and evasion, as well as to overcome 
linguistic discrepancies contained in the text of the communication and in most 
decisions of the European Court of Justice”. 
 
Furthermore, as was so properly described in Point (2) of the ATAD’s Preamble: Only 
a common framework could prevent fragmentation of the market and put an end to the 
currently existing mismatches and distortions” - which is why we should use hermeneutical 
canons more cautiously and fine-tune new modern techniques to finally precise the 
aforementioned concepts.  
Moreover, the European Commission has issued recommendations on how to implement 
measures to avoid the abuse of tax treaties. 
In fact, tax treaties play an important role in forging international relations and 
facilitating trade and its efficiency. These treaties, however, should not give way to non-
taxation or to unjustified reduced taxation, which is why the European Commission has lend 
its full support into tackling tax treaty abuse. Thus, following the discussions and release of 
the BEPS report by the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) 
- in particular Action 6, which identifies tax treaty abuse (among others, focusing on treaty 
                                       
35 A good example of this is the ECJ, Elisa ruling, C-451/05, of 11 October 2007: in §§ 80 and 91, the 
expressions in the Italian, Portuguese, Spanish and Danish versions mean tax fraud, whereas in the English, 
French and German versions the expressions refer to tax evasion. 
36 PISTONE, PASQUALE Ups and downs in the case law of the European court of justice and the swinging 
pendulum of direct taxation, Intertax, volume 36 n.º 4, 2008, p. 152.  
15 
shopping) - the report recommends the inclusion of a general anti-abuse rule based on a 
principal purpose test (PPT) of transactions or arrangements. 
It is also essential for the smooth functioning of the internal market that the Member 
States be able to efficiently operate tax systems and prevent the undue erosion of their tax 
bases due to inadvertent non-taxation and abuse. Additionally, they should implement 
solutions to protect their tax bases from creating undue mismatches and market distortions. 
It was from these incentives that was born the new general anti-abuse rule in the current 
ATAD. 
 
II - Abuse of Tax Law within the European Union 
 
1. Measures taken within the Legal Order 
 
 The ECJ has consistently held that “community law does not preclude a Member 
State from adopting, in the absence of harmonization, measures designed to prevent the 
opportunities created under the Treaty from being abused in a manner contrary to the 
legitimate interest of the State”37.  
With taxation remaining predominantly within the sovereign responsibility of the 
Member States, only limited competence has been assigned to the EU. As such, only indirect 
taxes have been harmonized (in particular VAT and capital taxes) and the power to regulate 
direct taxation remains largely with the Member State – which severely hinders the ideal of 
someday having a true single market in the EU, seeing as the EU decisions on tax matters 
require unanimous agreement by all Member States38. 
                                       
37 DE BROE & BECKERS, LUC AND DORIEN, The General Anti-Abuse Rule of the Anti-tax avoidance 
Directive, EC Tax Review, 2017-3; See also the following rulings: ECJ, Knoors C-115/78 §25; ECJ, 
Bouchoucha, C-61/89 §13 ; ECJ, Kraus C- 19/92; and ECJ, Paletta, C-206/94 which shows, in its §24 that 
“the Court has consistently held that Community law cannot be relied on for the purposes of abuse or 
fraud”. 
38 TEIXEIRA, GLORIA, Manual de Direito Fiscal, 3ª edição, Almedina, Coimbra, 2015, p. 385. 
16 
Today it is undeniable that taxpayers should be allowed to, within the legal structure, 
manage their business and orient their decisions in the way they deem more favorable to their 
interests. In fact, tax planning is foreseen under EU case law both in the Halifax & Others 
ruling39, in Cadbury Schweppes40, and in several other renowned abuse-related rulings41. 
Thus, the concern is whether the operation was structured within the legal tax-frame, 
not only according to the legislative text, but also in line with its spirit – in line with the 
objective in which the law was approved. 
 
LUC DE BROE and DORIEN BECKERS have stated42 that the prevention of tax evasion 
appears under EU law in three forms: (1) as a justification ground potentially capable of 
justifying direct tax restrictions of the fundamental freedoms; (2) as an authorization in tax 
directives for the Member States to enact anti-abuse measures ; and (3) in the field of VAT 
(and other indirect taxes) as a purpose-oriented interpretation method in order to delineate 
the (non-abusive/proper) scope of the subjective right invoked by the tax payer. However, 
we believe that there is a fourth form in which the prevention of tax evasion may appear: 
through General Anti-Abuse Rules, which we will develop on further below. 
 
Considering the above, it is now known that the EU has embarked in an ambitious 
tax reform agenda to ensure fair and effective corporate taxation in the Single Market. In 
order to go forward with this agenda, and given the global nature of aggressive tax planning 
and harmful tax competition, Member States have called for a harmonized approach to 
address external challenges to their tax bases.  
 
                                       
39 ECJ, Halifax & Others, §75: “(…) As the Advocate General observed in point 85 of his Opinion, 
taxpayers may choose to structure their business so as to limit their tax liability.” 
40 ECJ, Cadbury Schweppes §37: “As to freedom of establishment, the Court has already held that the fact 
that the company was established in a Member State for the purpose of benefiting from more favorable 
legislation does not in itself suffice to constitute abuse of that freedom”. 
41 Such as ECJ, Centros, C- 212/ 97, 9 March 1999, § 27, and ECJ, Inspire Art, C-167/01, 30 September 
2003, §96. 
42 In DE BROE, L. & BECKERS, D. The General Anti-abuse Rule of the Anti-tax avoidance Directive, 
EC Tax Review, volume 3, 2017. 
17 
In accordance to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council on an external strategy for effective taxation43, currently, effective taxation 
regarding third countries is mainly tackled through national anti-evasion measures, which 
tend to vary considerably from country to country. Among the different national approaches 
are specific provisions for transactions that occur with low/no tax jurisdictions; black, grey 
and white lists; and even case-by-case anti-abuse provisions – however, even the basis used 
to decide which jurisdictions should be subject to these measures differs from one Member 
State to the next. 
Nonetheless, as Member States try to coordinate their approaches and corporate tax 
policies within the Single Market, in order to ensure effective taxation and counter-act 
abusive tax practices, they still need to address their divergent approaches to tackling external 
BEPS threats. In fact, certain taxpayers / businesses exploit legal loopholes and mismatches 
between Member States' defensive measures to shift profits out of the Single Market, 
untaxed.  
Additionally, seeing as the diversity in approaches sends mixed messages to 
international partners about the EU's tax governance expectations and creates doubts about 
when defensive mechanisms will be triggered, companies face legal uncertainty and 
unnecessary administrative burdens when addressing third countries' tax systems. A 
coordinated EU external strategy on tax good governance is therefore essential to boost 
Member States' collective success in ensuring an effective taxation, tackling tax-evasion, and 
creating a clear and sustainable environment for businesses to operate in the Single Market. 
In light of the above, the official communication identifies a set of measure which are 
vital to promote good tax governance and tackle the erosion of the tax base due to profit 
shifting. 
Among other measures, the European Commission proposes the re-examination of 
good governance criteria, such as increased tax transparency and fairer tax competition.  
                                       
43 European Commission, Communication from the commission to the European parliament and the 
council on an External Strategy for Effective Taxation, COM (2016) 24 final, Brussels, 28.01.2016. 
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In order to fulfill these criteria, the European Commission has taken strides to apply 
and enforce the new automatic exchange of information global standard, and the OECD’s 
BEPS project. 
Furthermore, another step in the right direction would be the enhancing of good tax 
governance cooperation through agreement with third countries.  
Needless to say that this is essential to manage any positive stride towards the 
avoidance of tax abuse. In fact, even if all the Directives, recommendations and projects 
mentioned above were to be successfully applied, Third Countries could still offer companies 
enough room for abusive practices. Indeed, to establish no dialogue and maintain no treaties 
with countries outside the EU could give place to massive corporate delocalization, which 
would not only devastate the European economy but also create massive unemployment. 
 
As mentioned above, in § 85 of AG POIARES MADUROS’ Opinion regarding the Halifax 
& Others case law: 
“(…) the Court has consistently held, in consonance with the position generally 
accepted by Member States in the tax domain, that taxpayers may choose to 
structure their business so as to limit their tax liability”. 
Thus, if a Third Country were to offer better conditions to the companies at hand, they could 
chose to delocalize to that country, which would greatly impact Member States. 
 
In the direct tax area, the EU has tried to establish some criteria to ensure the smooth 
operation of the Single Market – notably through the Parent Subsidiary Directive44 (PSD), 
the Interest-Royalty Directive45 (IRD), the Merger Directive46 (MD), together known as the 
Corporate Tax Directives. However, up until the PSD was altered in 2015, these supposed 
GAAR’s were but mere allowances for the Member States to utilize their national legislation. 
                                       
44 Council Directive 2011/96/EU. 
45 Council Directive 2003/49/EC. 
46 Council Directive 2009/133/EC. 
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In fact, the PSD’s original general anti-abuse rules established but that “This 
Directive shall not preclude the application of domestic or agreement-based provisions 
required for the prevention of fraud or abuse”47, which we may all agree is not a general 
anti-abuse rule. 
With the implementation of Directive 2015/121/EU, Article 1 (2) of Directive 
2011/96/EU was amended to include the following: 
“2. Member States shall not grant the benefits of this Directive to an arrangement 
or a series of arrangements which, having been put into place for the main purpose 
or one of the main purposes of obtaining a tax advantage that defeats the object or 
purpose of this Directive, are not genuine having regard to all relevant facts and 
circumstances. An arrangement may comprise more than one step or part.  
3. For the purposes of paragraph 2, an arrangement or a series of arrangements 
shall be regarded as not genuine to the extent that they are not put into place for 
valid commercial reasons which reflect economic reality.  
4. This Directive shall not preclude the application of domestic or agreement-based 
provisions required for the prevention of tax evasion, tax fraud or abuse”. 
This GAAR foresees many of the tests we will analyze later in this dissertation48, 
among which (i) the principle purpose test; (ii) the conflict with object and purpose test; and 
(iii) the non-genuine / artificial reality test. 
The 2015 Directive also added that Member States shall bring into force the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive at the latest 
by 31 December 2015.  
In fact, the ECJ has, in many occasions stated that Member States have an obligation 
under Article 10 (currently Article 4 of the Treaty on the European Union) and Article 249 
(now Article 288 of the Treaty for the functioning of the European Union) to adopt measures 
necessary to ensure that the objectives pursued by the Directive are deemed effective. In other 
                                       
47 Article 1 (2) of Council Directive 2011/96/EU of 30 November 2011. 
48 In Part III n.º 2. 
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words, Member States are under the obligation to prevent abuse of the EU law, and have the 
duty to apply and interpret it in the way most likely to give full effect to its objectives. 
Moreover, seeing as EU law has a general priority over national law, the concepts of 
abuse under national law must comply with those established at the European level. Member 
States may establish overriding reasons in public interest, but in the end they will still have 
to demonstrate how the measure transposed will still be able to attain its objectives. 
Considering the amount of companies who still try to benefit from legal loopholes and 
the complexities related to the steps required from the national tax authorities to identify 
abuse, the ECJ has become essential to the creation and (above all) clarification of the EU’s 
understanding on the matter of abuse.  
 
2. The ECJ’s case law 
 
For years, several  rulings tried in vain to justify the importance of avoiding tax abuse as 
a matter worthy of temporarily infringing on fundamental freedoms49- but it was only with 
the ICI50 ruling that the risk of tax abuse was considered by the Courts as a general interest 
motive. However, even then this justification was only allowed if the provision in question 
did not “have the specific purpose of preventing wholly artificial arrangements, set up to 
circumvent (…) tax legislation, from attracting tax benefits”51.  
However, it was only with the Marks & Spencer52 ruling that tax evasion (in the sense 
considered in this dissertation, but referenced in the ruling as “avoidance”) was accepted as 
a justification for tax measures to restrict fundamental freedoms, and only through the 
consideration justifications taken together. 
Seeing as the ECJ clearly needed a method of analysis that could distinguish between 
the legitimate exercise of a fundamental freedom from those that give rise to abuse, it seized 
                                       
49 Such as ECJ, Avoir Faire C-270/83 §§ 23-25 and ECJ, Biehl, C-175/88 of 8 May 2001. 
50 ECJ, Imperial Chemical Industries plc (ICI) v Kenneth Hall Colmer (Her Majesty's Inspector of Taxes), 
C-264/96, 16 July 1998. 
51 ECJ, ICI, C-264/9, 16 July 1998 § 26. 
52 ECJ, Marks & Spencer, C-446/03, 13 December 2005, § 49. 
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the opportunity, in Emsland Stärke53, to develop a test that would allow national courts to 
draw a distinction between the two situations. 
To put the ruling into context, Emsland-Stärke GmbH was a German company who 
explored several consignments of potato-based products to Switzerland – for which it 
received an export refund for VAT purposes. However, the German authorities discovered 
that immediately after the goods were released at the Swiss customs for home use, the 
consignments in question were transported back to Germany (or to Italy), for which the 
authorities demanded that Emsland-Stärke pay back the refund. Legally, the company 
fulfilled the criteria for the export refund – in accordance with Commission Regulation (EEC) 
n.º 2730/79 on 29 November 197954 -reason why they challenged the decision. The issue 
facing the ECJ was whether, in the event of a purely formal exportation with the sole purpose 
of benefitting from the refund, the Commissions’ regulation precluded the obligation to repay 
said refund. Thus, in §§ 51 to 53, the ECJ replied the following: 
“The scope of [EU] regulations must in no case be extended to cover abuses on the 
part of a trader (Cremer, cited above, paragraph 21). The Court has also held that 
the fact that importation and re-exportation operations were not realized as bona 
fide commercial transactions but only in order wrongfully to benefit from the grant 
of monetary compensatory amounts, may preclude the application of positive 
monetary compensatory amounts {General Milk Products, cited above, paragraph 
21). 
A finding of an abuse requires, first, a combination of objective circumstances in 
which, despite formal observance of the conditions laid down by the Community 
rules, the purpose of those rules has not been achieved. 
It requires, second, a subjective element consisting in the intention to obtain an 
advantage from the Community rules by creating artificially the conditions laid 
down for obtaining it. The existence of that subjective element can be established, 
                                       
53 ECJ, Emsland Stärke, C-110/99, 14 December 2000. 
54 Which laid down common rules for the application of the system of export refunds on agricultural 
products. 
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inter alia, by evidence of collusion between the Community exporter receiving the 
refunds and the importer of the goods in the non-member country”. 
This was a ground-breaking ruling seeing as it was the first time a seminal judgment 
laid down the criteria for determining the existence of abuse in EU law. Notwithstanding the 
above, in this sentence the ECJ left open the question of whether this criteria would be 
extensible to the field of taxation. The answer to this only came in further rulings, such as 
Halifax & Others. 
As a matter of fact, Halifax, a Banking company, wished to build new call centers in 
Northern Ireland. Following the tax planning scenario that was laid out by its advisors, the 
company was able to set up a series of transactions involving different companies from its 
Group, which allowed it to recover all the VAT paid in respect to the construction work for 
the aforementioned call centers. However, Halifax’s VAT refund was denied by the British 
Tax Authorities on the grounds that the whole transaction was entered into solely to avoid 
VAT. Thus, the Court replied, that “The fact nevertheless remains that the question whether 
a given transaction is carried out for the sole purpose of obtaining a tax advantage is entirely 
irrelevant in determining whether it constitutes a supply of goods or services and an 
economic activity”55. The purpose does not matter as long as it fulfills the objective criteria 
on which the supply of goods and services and economic activity is based. 
The Court concluded, in Halifax & Others the following position: 
“The application of Community legislation cannot be extended to cover abusive 
practices by economic operators, that is to say transactions carried out not in the 
context of normal commercial operations, but solely for the purpose of wrongfully 
obtaining advantages provided for by Community law (see, to that effect, Case 
125/76 Cremer [1977] ECR 1593, paragraph 21; Case C-8/92 General Milk 
Products [1993] ECR I-779, paragraph 21; and Emsland-Stärke, paragraph 51).” 
And later “Preventing possible tax evasion, avoidance and abuse is an objective 
recognized and encouraged by the Sixth Directive” 56. 
                                       
55 ECJ, Halifax, C-255/02 § 59. 
56 ECJ, Halifax, C-255/02 §§ 69 and 71. 
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The Court did not, however, forbid tax planning, as it conceded that taxpayers can 
choose to structure their business so as to limit their tax liability57 – such as was argued by 
AG POIARES MADURO in § 85 of his Opinion. 
Thus, the ECJ laid down the following criteria:  
“In view of the foregoing considerations, it would appear that, in the sphere of VAT, 
an abusive practice can be found to exist only if, first, the transactions concerned, 
notwithstanding formal application of the conditions laid down by the relevant 
provisions of the Sixth Directive and the national legislation transposing it, result 
in the accrual of a tax advantage the grant of which would be contrary to the 
purpose of those provisions. 
Second, it must also be apparent from a number of objective factors that the 
essential aim of the transactions concerned is to obtain a tax advantage. As the 
Advocate General observed in point 89 of his Opinion, the prohibition of abuse is 
not relevant where the economic activity carried out may have some explanation 
other than the mere attainment of tax advantages”58. 
Here the Emsland-Stärke tests were somewhat modified as the objective test did not 
refer to a combination of objective circumstances and the subjective test did not refer to the 
artificial creation of circumstances59. 
If the subjective60 and objective requirements above were met (being the transaction 
contrary to the purpose of the provision it is using to feign legality and essentially aimed at 
                                       
57 Which has been recognized in jurisdictions all around the world, including in the United Stated of 
America – the country championing judicial activism as the best method of countering tax avoidance. As 
referenced by VANISTENDAEL, Frans, Is tax avoidance the same thing under the OECD Base Erosion 
and Profit Shifting Action Plan, National Tax Law and EU Law?, Bulletin for international Taxation, 
volume 70 n.º3, 2016, pp.167: “in the famous case of Gregory v. Helvering (1934), Judge Learned Hand, 
the judge of the US Court of Appeals (USCA), emphasized that: anyone may so arrange his affairs that 
his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the 
Treasury, there is no patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes”. 
58 ECJ, Halifax, C-255/02 §§ 74-75. 
59 PETROVITCH, Katrina Abuse under the Merger Directive, European Taxation, volume 50, nº 12, 2010, 
p.560; and DE BROE, Luc, International Tax planning and prevention of abuse, IBDF, 2008, p. 771-775. 
60 Though this subjective element if not explicitly referenced in the ruling due to severe criticism laid out 
to the Court before the issuing of its ruling. See AG Poiares Maduro’s Opinion §§ 70 - 71. Indeed, for the 
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obtaining a tax advantage), the transaction would be considered an abuse practice and, in 
accordance to § 94, would have to be redefined in order to re-establish the situation that 
would have prevailed in the absence of the transactions constituting the abusive practice. 
This was, naturally, a huge breakthrough in indirect taxation. The question remained, 
however, on whether the same rules applied to direct taxation (which, unlike VAT was not 
harmonized at the EU’s level), until the ECJ’s judgment on 12 September 2006 – commonly 
known as the Cadbury Schweppes ruling61. Dealing with controlled foreign companies 
(“CFC”) rules – legislation which allowed the United Kingdom’s Inland Revenue services to 
tax UK-resident parent companies who received profits from their foreign subsidiaries 
(provided certain criteria were fulfilled)62 - the Cadbury Schweppes case offered the ECJ a 
chance to explain the expression “wholly artificial arrangements”. The taxation of CFCs 
mentioned above came with a list of exceptions63, amongst which the so-called “motive test”, 
which required two cumulative criteria: 
“First, where the transactions which gave rise to the profits of the CFC for the 
accounting period in question produce a reduction in United Kingdom tax 
compared to that which would have been paid in the absence of those transactions 
and where the amount of that reduction exceeds a certain threshold, the resident 
company must show that such a reduction was not the main purpose, or one of the 
main purposes, of those transactions. 
Secondly, the resident company must show that it was not the main reason, or one 
of the main reasons, for the SEC’s existence in the accounting period concerned to 
achieve a reduction in United Kingdom tax by means of the diversion of profits. 
According to that legislation, there is a diversion of profits if it is reasonable to 
suppose that, had the SEC or any related company established outside the United 
                                       
AG, the intentions of the parties are only inferable from the artificial arrangements set up in light of 
objective circumstances. Arguably, the Halifax case law suggests that the objective factor may suffice to 
conclude on an abusive practice. 
61 ECJ, Cadbury Schweppes, C-196/04. 
62 i.e. in so long as the parent company owned over 50% shares of the subsidiary (CFC); the CFC be 
subject to a lower taxation rate in the Member State in which it was established (as explained in §§ 6 – 
 7); etc. 
63 ECJ, Cadbury Schweppes, C-196/04 § 8 to §11. 
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Kingdom not existed, the receipts would have been received by, and been taxable in 
the hands of, a United Kingdom resident”. 
Thus, the taxpayer had to effectively prove that the reduction of tax was not the main 
purpose, or one of the main purposes of the arrangement. 
The Cadbury Schweppes case went on to set out very important guidelines (some of 
which were already in place for indirect taxation thanks to the Halifax case), such as the fact 
that setting up subsidiaries in other Member States in order to reduce the company’s tax 
liability is not in itself considered abuse64.  
Furthermore, the ECJ acknowledged that the UK legislation on CFCs restricted the EU 
fundamental freedom of establishment seeing as it made it harder for companies with foreign 
subsidiaries than for companies with subsidiaries established in the UK. However, and as 
clearly stated in § 51: 
“restricting freedom of establishment may be justified where it specifically relates 
to wholly artificial arrangements aimed at circumventing the application of the 
legislation of the Member State concerned (…)65”.  
 Hence, in order for such a restriction to be justified, the ECJ would have to examine 
the object of the freedom and conclude that its restriction would prevent the creation of a 
wholly artificial arrangement – which would distort the normal taxation of profits by not 
reflecting the entity’s economic reality.  
 This measure shows, in many ways, the connection between the combat of tax evasion 
and the important task of safeguarding the balanced allocation of Member States’ power of 
purse / power to tax. 
 Furthermore, another essential implication that can be grasped by Cadbury Schweppes 
is how much narrower its concept of abuse is, in relation to other ECJ rulings, such as Halifax 
& Others. It does, however, set at least some concrete criteria in its § 67:  
                                       
64 ECJ, Cadbury Schweppes, C-196/04 § 37-38. 
65 See also ECJ, ICI, C-264/96, § 26. 
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“[the finding of genuine economic activity] must be based on objective factors 
which are ascertainable by third parties with regard, in particular, to the extent to 
which the CFC physically exists in terms of premises, staff and equipment”. 
 Professor KOEN LENAERTS noted in his Article called The concept of ‘abuse of law’ in 
the case law of the European Court of Justice on direct taxation that66: 
“(…) whilst in the former case [Cadbury Schweppes] the Court of Justice defined 
‘abusive practices’ as ‘wholly artificial arrangements’, in the latter case [Halifax] 
it held that ‘the essential aim of the transaction concerned is to obtain a tax 
advantage”. 
 
 In later jurisprudence, such as in Part Service67, the ECJ clarified the expression 
“essential aim of the transaction” in so far as it does not need the be “the sole aim”: 
“(…) the Sixth Directive must be interpreted as meaning that there can be a finding 
of an abusive practice when the accrual of a tax advantage constitutes the principal 
aim of the transaction or transactions at issue68” (our underlining). 
 By introducing the notion of principal purpose, instead of essential aim, some authors 
such as FRANS VANSTANDAEL69 believe that at least for the interpretation of VAT rules the 
notion requires us to compare the motives as to their importance (in regards to the volume 
and importance of the tax advantage). 
 Hence, a national court may find there to be abuse even if valid economic reasons are 
also brought forth (i.e. marketing, organization, etc), as long as the principal aim was the 
evasion of tax. 
                                       
66 LENAERTS, Koen, The concept of ‘abuse of law’ in the case law of the European Court of justice on 
direct taxation, MJ, 2015. 
67 ECJ, Part Service, C-425/06, 10 March 2006. 
68 ECJ, Part-Service C-425/06, 10 March 2006, §45. 
69 VANISTENDAEL, FRANS. Chapter 11: EU vs. BEPS: conflicting concepts of Tax avoidance, EU 
LAW and the Building of Global supranational Tax Law: EU BEPS and State Aid, online book IBFD, 
2017, p. 6. 
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 Moreover, in recent direct tax rulings, such as Societé de Gestion Industrielle S.A. (SGI) 
v. État Belge70, the objective test is not even mentioned – though arguably authors71 accept 
that the aforementioned test is implied (seeing as the ruling explicitly refers to Cadbury 
Schweppes). 
Furthermore, it is important to note how each Member State is free to choose the 
criteria used to determine the application of corporate law, be it related to the ‘registered 
office’, the ‘central administration’, or its ‘principal place of business’. Similarly, in the 
absence of harmonization of direct taxation in the EU, Member States are free to determine 
the level of taxation it wishes to apply. Thus, unavoidably, a company may rely on its right 
to free movement in order to obtain a more favorable tax treatment in another Member State, 
in so far as the branch it registered in the latter carries out a genuine economic activity.  
Finally, since the OY AA ruling72 it seems that the ECJ has loosened the criteria for 
wholly artificial arrangements as, in accepting combined justifications73, in OY AA the Court 
accepted a combination of 2 factors74: one concerning the safeguard of the balanced 
allocation of the power to tax, and two being the need to prevent tax avoidance [meant as 
evasion]. Then, it concluded that “Conduct involving the creation of wholly artificial 
arrangements which do not reflect economic reality, with a view to escaping the tax normally 
due on the profits generated by activities carried out on national territory is such as to 
undermine the right of the Member States to exercise their tax jurisdiction in relation to those 
activities and jeopardise a balanced allocation between Member States of the power to 
impose taxes” and further added that “Even if the legislation at issue in the main proceedings 
is not specifically designed to exclude from the tax advantage it confers purely artificial 
arrangements, devoid of economic reality, created with the aim of escaping the tax normally 
due on the profits generated by activities carried out on national territory, such legislation 
                                       
70 ECJ, Societé de Gestion Industrielle S.A. (SGI) v. État Belge, C-311/08, 21 January 2010. 
71 Such as PETROVICH, Katrina. Abuse under the Merger Directive, European Taxation, volume 50, nº 
12, 2010, p. 560. 
72 ECJ, OY AA, C-231/05, 18 July 2007, concerning the Finnish group contribution system - where the 
ECJ held that by the “rule of reason principle”, Finland had an overriding public interest in restricting the 
freedom of establishment. 
73 ECJ, Marks & Spencer, C-446/03, 13 December 2005. 
74 ECJ, OY AA, C-231/05, 18 July 2007 § 60. 
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may nevertheless be regarded as proportionate to the objectives pursued, taken as a 
whole.”75 
Thus, in the OY AA ruling there seems to be no need to prove the artificiality of the 
arrangement seeing as the arrangement touches the very core of the Member State’s 
sovereign power76. 
 
This having been said, some Member States have exceeded the means necessary to 
combat abusive practices, as in the Itelcar77 judgement – which is why the national measures 
implemented in Member States must be sufficiently calibrated to aim only at prohibiting truly 
abusive practices. General presumptions that certain transactions constitute purely abusive 
practices will not suffice to comply with the principle of proportionality. 
Cadbury Schweppes, Thin Cap78, and Glaxo Wellcome79 are, among others, cases that 
provide useful guidance for national courts to determine whether the methods use to prohibit 
abuse are in compliance with the fundamental freedoms. In fact, the court must first 
understand what fundamental freedom applies. Then, examine whether the norm in question 
restricts that freedom. And, if it turns out to be the case, the ECJ must examine whether this 
is a justifiable restriction. 
 
3. Burden of proof 
 
The practical effects of the ECJ’s case law regarding “wholly artificial arrangements” 
depend largely on the question of who has to bear the burden of proof – specifically on 
whether it is up to the tax authorities to establish that an arrangement is not genuine and 
wholly artificial o whether they can shift that burden onto the taxpayer.  
                                       
75 ECJ, OY AA, C-231/05, 18 July 2007 §§ 62-63. 
76 MATEI, EMANUELA. Same Same but different. A misunderstanding of the EU tax jurisprudence with 
possible negative spill-over effects on the BEPS recommendations, Kluwer International Tax Blog, 
October 15, 2015. 
77 ECJ, Itelcar and Fazenda Pública, C-282/12, 3 October 2013. 
78 ECJ, Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation, C-524/04, 13 March 2007. 
79 ECJ, Glaxo Welcome, C‑182/08. 
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Here, it is important to mention the Bent Vestergaard80 case law, which establishes in 
its § 26 the following: 
“it should be remembered that Council Directive 77/799/EEC of 19 December 1977 
concerning mutual assistance by the competent authorities of the Member States in 
the field of direct taxation (OJ 1977 L 336, p. 15) can be invoked by a Member State 
in order to obtain from the competent authorities of another Member State all the 
information enabling it to ascertain the correct amount of income tax. In addition, 
there is nothing to prevent the tax authorities concerned from requiring the taxpayer 
himself to produce the proof which they consider necessary to assess whether or not 
the deduction requested should be allowed (see Bachmann and Commission v 
Belgium, cited above, at respectively paragraphs 18 and 20 and paragraphs 11 and 
13)”. 
Thus, if the first part of the paragraph implies that the tax authorities can obtain 
information more easily though the application of the mutual assistance directive, in its 
second part, it determines that there is nothing to prevent the tax authorities from requiring 
the taxpayer himself to produce the proof that they consider necessary to assess the merit of 
the question (deduction).  
However, as explained by TOMAS CANTISTA TAVARES81: “It is very hard  to prove that 
there was a pre-conceived plan; that all the steps were taken with the desire to evade 
taxation; that in the initial/primordial moments there was already the intention to evade 
taxation”, making the tax authorities’ attempts very difficult and usually requiring them to 
apply very broad accusations. However, both in harmonized and in non-harmonized tax 
matters, that presumptions of tax avoidance or tax evasion are considered disproportionate 
and it is settled case law that these should not be accepted. As explained in the Foggia82 
ruling, national tax authorities mustn’t apply pre-determined general criteria, instead having 
to perform a case by case analysis and consider the circumstances as a whole. 
                                       
80 ECJ, Skatteministeriet v Bent Vestergaard, C-55/98, 28 October 1999. 
81 CANTISTA TAVARES, Tomás, IRC e Contabilidade – da realização ao justo valor, Almedina, 2018, 
p. 397: “É muito difícil apurar e provar que houve um plano pré-concebido; que todos os passos estão 
ligados por um desejo de fuga ao imposto; que no momento inicial já se sabia da evasiva intenção fiscal”. 
82 ECJ, Foggia, C-126/10, 10 November 2011, § 37. 
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It was only in Cadbury Schweppes that the court emphasized that the resident company 
(taxpayer) also take action.  
“The resident company, which is best placed for that purpose, must be given an 
opportunity to produce evidence that the CFC is actually established and that its 
activities are genuine83”. 
Thus, and in accordance to the legal right of defense (commonly accepted in democratic 
countries), the tax authorities may not assess that an arrangement is artificial without 
confronting the taxpayer and its preliminary conclusions / justifications. 
However, as shown in § 71 of the same case law, tax authorities may not completely 
shift the burden to the taxpayers not reject evidence by him provided. 
The obligations from both parties must be balanced, as established in the Test 
Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation84 case law:  
“national legislation which provides for a consideration of objective and verifiable 
elements in order to determine whether a transaction represents a purely artificial 
arrangement, entered into for tax reasons alone, is to be considered as not going 
beyond what is necessary to prevent abusive practices where, in the first place, on 
each occasion on which the existence of such an arrangement cannot be ruled out, 
the taxpayer is given an opportunity, without being subject to undue administrative 
constraints, to provide evidence of any commercial justification that there may have 
been for that arrangement”. (our underline).  
 
Moreover, the ECJ accepted in the SGI v. État Belge ruling that:  
“the burden of proof as to the existence of an ‘unusual’ or ‘gratuitous’ advantage 
within the meaning of the legislation at issue in the main proceeding rests with the 
national tax authorities. It states that when those authorities apply that legislation, 
the taxpayer is given an opportunity to provide evidence of any commercial 
justification that there may have been for the transaction in question. The taxpayer 
                                       
83 ECJ, Cadbury Schweppes, C-196/04 § 70. 
84 ECJ, Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation, C-524/04, 13 March 2007 §82. 
31 
has a month, a period which may be extended, within which to establish that no 
unusual or gratuitous advantage is involved, having regard to the circumstances in 
which the transaction was effected. If, however, those authorities persist in their 
intention of issuing a revised assessment and do not accept the taxpayer’s 
arguments, the latter can challenge the assessment to tax before the national 
courts85”. 
 
Which is why we can conclude that the burden of proof is to be shared between the tax 
authorities and the taxpayer – requiring a case-by-case analysis.  
 
III – General Anti-Abuse Rules (GAARs) 
 
1. Traditional approach in Direct Tax Directives 
 
a) Aggressive Tax Planning 
 
Twenty (and more) years ago, a number of countries already had experience with 
GAARs or other specific provisions that permitted the tax authorities to challenge a 
taxpayer’s transactions as constituting tax evasion – including the Netherlands, Germany and 
France, among others. 
The expression “aggressive tax planning” (which nowadays is an umbrella concept86) 
follows the sudden changes in the international economic and financial environment. In 
particular, the interaction amongst tax treatments provided for by the different jurisdictions 
gives rise not only to the undesired overlapping of taxation rights (double taxation), but also 
                                       
85 ECJ, Societé de Gestion Industrielle S.A. (SGI) v. État Belge, C-311/08, 21 January 2010 § 73. 
86 Seeing as “it includes both international tax planning and tax avoidance” [used in the meaning of 
evasion], as stated by DOURADO, Ana Paula, The meaning of Aggressive Tax Planning and Avoidance 
in the European Union and the OECD: An example of Legal plurism in international tax law, IBFD, 2016 
p. 258. 
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to the unforeseen loopholes (producing situations of double non-taxation or negative 
taxation). 
With Council Directive 2011/96/EU, of 30 November 2011 on the common system 
of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member 
States (also known as the Parent company and subsidiary Directive), the first European anti-
abuse restriction was established, as the Directive foresaw, in its Article 1 that  
“This Directive shall not preclude the application of domestic or agreement-based 
provisions required for the prevention of fraud or abuse”. 
In 2012, the European Commission published a recommendation on “aggressive tax 
planning” which contained a “general anti-abuse rule” that defined abuse as “an artificial 
arrangement or artificial series of arrangements” whose essential purpose is the avoidance of 
taxation or the benefit of a tax reduction87.  
However, in truth, companies engaged in “aggressive tax planning” [tax evasion] will 
continue to try and find ways of bypassing rules and find loopholes in tax laws. The ATAD 
GAAR’s major novelty is that with its implementation EU countries will gain the power to 
actually tackle artificial arrangements even if other specific rules (SAARs) don’t cover it. 
 
b) Previous GAARs 
 
 For a very long time, the reference to abuse in EU Directives was basically non-
existent, usually only referring to the institutions of fraud or tax evasion. In fact, in its first 
version, the PSD very briefly mentioned abuse, while the MD only spoke of fraud. It was 
only with the IRD that a “first GAAR draft” was brought forth in its Article 5 (2), which 
stated that: “Member States may, in the case of transactions for which the principal motive 
                                       
87 Commission recommendation of 6 December 2012 on aggressive tax planning. In point 4.5 they stated 
that “the purpose of an arrangement or series of arrangements consists in avoiding taxation where, 
regardless of any subjective intentions of the taxpayer, it defeats the object, spirit or purpose of the tax 
provisions that would otherwise apply”.  
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or one of the principal motives is tax evasion, tax avoidance or abuse, withdraw the benefits 
of this Directive or refuse to apply this Directive” 88. 
Directive 2015/121/EC of 27 January 2015 adopts a GAAR to prevent abusive tax 
planning structures aimed at benefitting from the participation exemption regime foreseen in 
the Parent Subsidiary Directive.  
The Directive foresees, in Article 1, that “Member States shall not grant the benefits 
of this Directive to an arrangement or a series of arrangements which, having been put into 
place for the main purpose or one of the main purposes of obtaining a tax advantage that 
defeats the object or purpose of this Directive, are not genuine having regard to all relevant 
facts and circumstances. (…)”.  
The mention to these “relevant facts and circumstances” emphasizes the case-by-case 
analysis. 
It further clarifies that “an arrangement or a series of arrangements shall be regarded 
as not genuine to the extent that they are not put into place for valid commercial reasons 
which reflect economic reality”. However, the conditions or criteria that should be taken into 
consideration to assess the existence of “valid commercial reasons” or “economic reality” 
are not clarified and, for most countries, depend greatly on domestic legislation or criteria. 
Despite the above, some countries such as Portugal, even if adopting the new GAAR89 
by altering Articles 14 and 51 of the Portuguese Corporate Income Tax, known as Código do 
Imposto sobre as Pessoas Colectivas (“CIRC”), did not provide any clarification on those 
terms. Portugal is one of the countries that already had a national anti-abuse rule, which in 
its case was provided under Article 38.º of their General Tax Law. However, like so many 
other Member States, Portugal lost a lot of revenue due to savy tax-evasion and the use of 
legal loopholes. 
 
2. The ATAD GAAR 
 
                                       
88 Directive 2003/49/EC, of 3 June 2003. 
89 Through Law 5/2016 of 29 February 2016. 
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The speed in which the new EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD) was 
approved – not only to fulfil the Base Erosion Profit Shifting timeframe – is symptomatic of 
the level of urgency felt across EU Member States to respond to the challenges raised by the 
globalization and digitalization of the economy. 90 
As a matter of fact, the ATAD is an exercise of coordination of Member States’ 
corporate tax systems according to the BEPS Action Plans (proposed by the OECD in 2015), 
and with an eye to the Single Market. It tries to balance, on one side, the functioning of the 
Single Market (which means fair competition and European fundamental freedoms - pillars 
of the internal market); and on the other side, the protection of domestic tax systems, so that 
they obtain their fair share of public revenues. In truth, it seems clear that the existence of 
Modern States heavily depends on taxation91. 
The ATAD is nothing other than an attempt to balance supranational interests and 
domestic ones. The package ensures the creation of a better/fairer business environment 
because it ensures EU-law conformity of ATA rules. It ensures “that tax is paid where profits 
and value is generated” in order to “restore trust in the fairness of the system and allow 
governments to effectively exercise their tax sovereignty”92. This ATA Package aims at 
assuring that taxes are paid where economic activity takes place, and it tries to eliminate the 
profit shifting through different measures: (1) strengthening domestic rules; (2) addressing 
treaty issues; (3) enhancing transparency; (4) building a common approach towards third 
countries.  
On January 28th 2016, the European Commission presented its Anti-Tax-Avoidance 
(“ATA”) Package as part of its campaign for fair, efficient and growth-friendly taxation in 
the EU with new proposals to tackle corporate tax avoidance93 (in line with anti BEPS 
                                       
90 DE LA FERIA, Rita, Harmonizing Anti Tax Avoidance rules, EC Tax Review, 2017. 
91 Even American Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. has argued in this direction by stating 
that “paying taxes buys us civilization”. 
92 ATAD, Point (1) of the Preamble. 
93 European Commission Press release, January 28th 2016, Brussels. 
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measures set forth in the previous year) applying to both domestic and cross-border 
situations94.  
The package is based around the three core pillars of the Commission's agenda for fairer 
taxation: ensuring effective taxation in the EU, increasing tax transparency, and securing a 
level playing field. It includes the a Chapeau Communication, the Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Directive, a Recommendation on Tax Treaties, a Revised Administrative Cooperation 
Directive, a Communication on External Strategy, a Staff working document and a study on 
aggressive tax planning, as shown below95: 
 
Some of the key features of this new proposals include: an anti-tax avoidance directive 
that brings forth legally-binding measures to block the most common methods used to avoid 
paying tax; a recommendation on how Member States can prevent tax treaty abuse; a 
cooperation proposal for Member States to share tax-related information on multinationals 
operating in the EU; actions to promote tax good governance internationally; and finally a 
new EU process for listing third countries that refuse to play fair. 
Collectively, the hope is for these measures to hamper aggressive tax planning, ensure 
fairer competition for all businesses, and boost transparency between Member States in the 
                                       
94 BÁEZ MORENO, Andrés, A pan-european GAAR? Some (un)expected consequences of the proposed 
EU Tax avoidance Directive combined with the Dzodi line of cases, British Tax Review, n.º 2, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2016, p. 143. 
 
95 European Commission, Anti-Tax Avoidance Package, 2016, [online] available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/anti-tax-avoidance-package_en 
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Single Market. This would also prevent uncoordinated and unilateral implementations of the 
anti-BEPS proposals (which could fragment the market and give leeway to even further legal 
loopholes for companies to explore). 
The ATAD, which is the focus of this dissertation, establishes several legally binding 
measures against aggressive tax planning (tax evasion).  
In particular, it aims to address situations in which business groups take advantage of 
disparities between national tax systems to reduce their overall tax obligations.  
To this end, it provides legal provisions against aggressive tax planning with regard to: 
interest limitation; exit tax rules; rules on controlled foreign companies (“CFC”); general 
anti-abuse rule; and rules on hybrid asymmetries. In fact, there are two kinds of provisions: 
Article 6 of the ATAD which concerns the GAAR and other provisions (such as Articles 4, 
5, 6, 8 and 9) directed towards preventing the erosion of the domestic corporate tax bases. 
In this way, the new GAAR largely resembles BEPS’ Action 6 (which brings forth the 
principle purpose test). In fact, some authors believe that “inspiration or even 
interpretational guidance can be found in the BEPS report”96.  
Thus, in order to understand this new Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive, it is important to 
focus on BEPS’ Action 6 to prevent treaty abuse and on the proposal of introducing a 
principle purpose test (“PPT”) – an anti-abuse rule for double taxation treaties. 
Thus, the aforementioned Action 6 seeks to: 
“Develop model treaty provisions and recommendations regarding the design of 
domestic rules to prevent the granting of treaty benefits in inappropriate 
circumstances. Work will also be done to clarify that tax treaties are not intended 
to be used to generate double non-taxation and to identify the tax policy 
considerations that, in general, countries should consider before deciding to enter 
into a tax treaty with another country. The work will be co‑ordinated with the work 
on hybrids”. (our underlining). 
                                       
96 BUNDGAARD & Schmidt, Jakob and Peter, Uncertainties Following the Final EU Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Directive, Kluwer International Tax Blog, 2016, p. 3. 
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And the Principle Purpose Test is described as follows: 
“Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Convention, a benefit under this 
Convention shall not be granted in respect of an item of income or capital if it is 
reasonable to conclude97, having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances, 
that obtaining that benefit was one of the principal purposes98 of any arrangement 
or transaction that resulted directly or indirectly in that benefit, unless it is 
established that granting that benefit in these circumstances would be in accordance 
with the object and purpose of the relevant provisions99 of this Convention”100. 
We can thus observe that two tests must be passed to determine whether the benefit of 
the treaty should be granted in a specific case: the subjective and the objective tests. The first 
one questions whether obtaining the benefit was one of the principal purposes of any 
arrangement or transaction that resulted directly or indirectly in that benefit; while the second 
one determines that the Treaty’s benefit must only be granted if its use is in accordance with 
the object and purpose of the Treaty provisions. 
However, at the EU level, the intention of obtaining a tax benefit and the importance 
of the aforementioned benefit is irrelevant if fundamental freedoms are in play101. If 
taxpayers only apply the principle purpose test, they may infringe European fundamental 
                                       
97 KOK, Reinout, The principal purpose test in tax treaties under BEPS 6, Intertax, Volume 44, Issue 5, 
Kluwer Law International BV, 2016, pp. 406-412 stated that “[this expression is] used so that a tax payer 
cannot avoid application of the PPT by merely asserting that the arrangement or transaction was not 
undertaken or arranged to obtain the benefits of the convention”. 
98 KOK, Reinout, The principal purpose test in tax treaties under BEPS 6, Intertax, Volume 44, Issue 5, 
Kluwer Law International BV, 2016, pp. 406-412 further explained that “The fact that has been chosen 
for ‘one of the principal purposes’ instead of e.g., for the ‘sole purpose’, the ‘essential purpose’ or 
‘predominant purpose’, makes it relatively easy for the tax authorities to establish that the subjective test 
is met”. 
99 KOK, Reinout, further stated that “There is no explicit reference to the ‘object and purpose’ of the treaty 
in general. In the author’s view, however, the ‘object and purpose’ of a treaty provision has to be 
interpreted in light of the ‘object and purpose’ of the treaty in general”. But where can we find the 
aforementioned ‘object and purpose’? ENGELEN, Frank, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under 
International Law, IBDF, 2004, pp. 175 of course explains that “The primary source for the ‘object and 
purpose’ of a treaty has to be found in the text of the treaty itself”. 
100 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2016/136 of 28 January 2016 on the implementation of measures 
against tax treaty abuse. 
101 VANISTENDAEL, Francs, Is tax avoidance the same thing under the OECD Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting Action Plan, National Tax Law and EU Law?, Bulletin for international Taxation, volume 70 n.º 
3, 2016, pp.167. 
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freedoms, which is why the new ATAD was careful to introduce its new GAAR (as Article 
6) in the following terms: 
“1- Non-genuine arrangements or a series thereof carried out for the essential 
purpose102 of obtaining a tax advantage103 that defeats the object or purpose104 of 
the otherwise applicable tax provisions shall be ignored for the purposes of 
calculating the corporate tax liability. An arrangement may comprise more than 
one step or part105. 
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, an arrangement106 or a series thereof shall be 
regarded as non-genuine107 to the extent that they are not put into place for valid 
commercial reasons108 which reflect economic reality. 
                                       
102 This is considered the first test. Here we note that the insertion of the ‘principle purpose test’ in the 
ATAD’s GAAR differentiates between primary/principle and secondary purposes, thus establishing that 
it does not suffice for it to be one of the purposes of the arrangement, it must be an essential reason for the 
taxpayer to have moved forward with the arrangement. However, some authors disagree with the 
existence/application of the principle purpose test (such as DE BROE and LUTS as they believe the main 
purpose test is unacceptable because the taxpayer will no longer be able to rely on obtaining a tax benefit 
when making business decisions. These authors, among others, believe that the test should be the sole or 
predominant purpose test. (DE  BROE & LUTS, Luc et Joris, BEPS Action 6: Tax Treaty Abuse, Intertax, 
volume 43 n.º2, Kluwer Law International BV, 2015), whereas some authors wonder if in practice there 
is any difference between the two tests, as their conclusions will often be the same (WEBER, Dennis, The 
New Common Minimum Anti-Abuse Rule in the EU Parent Subsidiary Directive: Background, Impact, 
Applicability, Purpose and Effect, Intertax, volume 44 n.º2, Kluwer Law International BV, 2016, p.110). 
103 Requires the manifestation of an advantage in comparison to another situation (though the OECD does 
not provide any clarifications as to what the conditions for a tax advantage are). 
104 Considered as the second test. For the arrangement to be considered wholly artificial, the means used 
to obtain the tax advantage must have been contrary to the object or purpose of the Directive.  
105 Thus the GAAR may only attack the part of the arrangement that is wholly artificial so as to not exceed 
its goal and infringe the proportionality principle. 
106 Which should be considered, in accordance with the European Commission, Recommendation of 6 
December 2012 on aggressive tax planning (2012/772/EU), OJEU 2012, § 4.3 as “any transaction, 
scheme, action, operation, agreement, grant, understanding, promise, undertaking or event”. 
107 This is considered the third test. This is also known to some as the substance test, requiring there to be 
valid commercial reasons lest the arrangement be artificial/non-genuine. This expression “valid 
commercial reasons” was explained in Leur Bloem §47 and later confirmed in Foggia (C-126/10) §34 as 
follows: “With regard to ‘valid commercial reasons’ within the meaning of that Article 11(1)(a), the Court 
has already had occasion to state that it is clear from the wording and aims of Article 11, as it is from 
those of Directive 90/434 in general, that the concept involves more than the attainment of a purely fiscal 
advantage. A merger by way of exchange of shares having only such an aim cannot therefore constitute a 
valid commercial reason within the meaning of that provision”. 
108 Though no clarification is brought as to the valid commercial reasons must belong to the business itself 
or if the shareholders interests in the company will suffice. 
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3. Where arrangements or a series thereof are ignored in accordance with 
paragraph 1, the tax liability shall be calculated by reference to economic substance 
in accordance with national law”. 
From this it is obvious that the ATAD’s GAAR has a de minimis approach: as it only 
contains a general provision109, it mandates that Member States ensure at least the minimum 
level of protection described in the Directive, allowing them to apply stricter/more restrictive 
rules if they so desire. 
Thus, in its current condition, this GAAR represents a shield for Member State’s 
revenue and corporate tax systems – though it is also important to note that the loss of tax 
revenue is not in itself a legitimate interest that justifies a restriction to fundamental 
freedoms110. 
Furthermore, if some authors fear that the Directive will be transposed differently in each 
Member State, disrupting the possibility of attaining a level playing field111 - others112 believe 
that because most countries will transpose the new ATAD GAAR exactly as recommended, 
this could lead to the final loss of interpretative control by Member States over their domestic 
GAARs even outside the scope of the Directive – seeing as the ECJ will probably assume 
increasing jurisdiction over domestic GAARs. 
Though this is a real concern for most Member States, other implications must also be 
considered, such as the modification of hundreds of double tax treaties – without the need 
for further bilateral negotiations. In fact, in June 2017 another important step was taken to 
                                       
109 As shown in the European Commission’s, Council Directive Communication laying down 
rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market. Com 
(2016) 26 final, Brussels 29 January 2016, p. 5 (Proportionality). 
110 As seen in ECJ, Skandia and Ramstedt, C-422/01, 26 June 2003, § 53. Unlike, for instance, the State’s 
need to ensure the effective collection of tax and the prevention of tax fraud and evasion. 
111 Such as Gianluigi Bizioli in Taking the EU Fundamental Freedoms Seriously: Does the Anti-tax 
Avoidance Directive Take precedence over the single market?, EC Tax Review, volume 3, 2017 p.171, 
stating that the possibility of implementing the Directive with a higher level of protection and with other 
options allowed, could deeply thwart the creation of a level playing field –“This approach gives Member 
States the opportunity to jeopardize the implementation of the Directive and frustrate the achievement of 
its objectives”. Furthermore, he adds that this concern is also raised by A. P. Dourado in The EU Anti Tax 
Avoidance Package: Moving ahead of BEPS? 44 (6-7), Intertax, 2016. 
112 Such as BÁEZ MORENO, Andrés, A pan-european GAAR? Some (un)expected consequences of the 
proposed EU Tax avoidance Directive combined with the Dzodi line of cases, British Tax Review, n.º 2, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2016, p. 151. 
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prevent abusive behaviours: 72 jurisdictions signed the Multilateral Convention to 
Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(hereinafter referred to as “MLI”). Both these instruments (ATAD and MLI) will 
significantly affect cross-border operations and trigger unprecedented changes in European 
taxation. Thus, besides preparing for these changes, the taxpayers with presence in traditional 
holdings and financing jurisdictions could prepare by confirming that their operations are 
supported by appropriate documentation as well as compliant with transfer pricing rules. 
Moreover, companies should confirm that they have made the necessary self-certifications 
under FATCA, CRS and CbcR, and other internal reporting processes – lest penalties be 
applied for delay and non-compliance.  
This having been considered, there are actions that the taxpayers may take in order to 
improve their positions in light of these alterations, such as align their structure with their 
business, tax and treasury objectives113.  
 
3. Legal Consequences of non-compliance 
   
Despite all that we have said, the legal consequences of ignoring a transaction for tax 
purposes is not clear.  
Article 6 (1) of the ATAD determines that Member States “shall ignore” 
arrangements that fulfill the requirements of the GAAR. Thus, once the conditions for the 
GAAR’s application are met, the targeted set up must be ignored.  
Turns out that Member States do not have any discretionary power whatsoever 
regarding the legal consequence of the norm’s application. This, however, raises the question 
of what “ignorance of legal transaction” really means. Must the “transaction involved in an 
abusive practice […]” be re-defined in order to re-establish the situation that would have 
prevailed in the absence of the transactions constituting that abusive practice? It is commonly 
agreed that the term “ignore” must be interpreted as “disregard or refuse to recognize”. The 
                                       
113 By, for instance, concentrating holding and financing companies in the same region (or at least have 
their investment policy under the same umbrella in a given jurisdiction); consolidating in the holding’s 
jurisdiction the asset management entities and fund vehicles. 
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abusive series of arrangements must simply be left out. Thus, based on the wording of Article 
6 (1) of the ATAD, national tax authorities would not be allowed to reclassify the abusive 
practice and replace it with another (taxable?) transaction. However Article 6 (3) provides 
that “Where arrangements or a series thereof are ignored in accordance with paragraph 1, 
the tax liability shall be calculated by reference to economic substance in accordance with 
national law”, which leaves it up to national tax authorities to re-calculate the tax liability in 
accordance with national law114. 
However, let us imagine the following scenario:  between Member State Portugal and 
the United States a ‘letterbox company’ with no substance is constituted in Belgium in order 
to avoid the Portuguese withholding tax on dividend paid to a US Co. Now, let’s assume that 
this letterbox Co. is considered artificial and constitutes an arrangement whose principle 
purpose is that of obtaining a tax advantage which is contrary to the objects and purpose of 
the EU Directives. The only way to undo this abusive situation is to somehow re-establish 
Portugal’s possibility of withholding tax on a dividend paid to the US Co. This can be 
achieved by “ignoring” the letterbox company in Belgium and considering as if the dividends 
paid from the Portuguese Co. went directly to the US Co. (as if the artificial arrangement had 
not been set). This will still allow for the use of lower rates established in bilateral tax treaties 
to avoid double taxation, avoiding only the (probably lower) rates that would have been 
applicable between Portugal and Belgium instead. 
This approach has been adopted by jurisprudence since the Weald Leasing115 case-law 
in so far as the ECJ decided:  
“it would (…) be for that court to redefine those transactions so as to re-establish 
the situation that would have prevailed in the absence of the elements constituting 
that abusive practice”, further adding that “the redefinition by that court must go no 
further than is necessary for the correct charging of the VAT and the prevention of 
tax evasion (see, to that effect, Halifax and Others, paragraph 92)”. 
                                       
114 Though it is important to note that when this clause extends to financial and other dematerialized 
activities, it is difficult to picture staff, equipment and the ownership of assets at the same level as 
‘traditional’ economic activities. Thus, for the ‘economic substance’ requirement to be compliant with 
ECJ case-law, its implementation and interpretation must be broad enough to encompass these cases. 
115 ECJ, Weald Leasing, C-103/09, 22 December 2010, §50 and §52. 
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This brings us to a vital point regarding legal consequences. In fact, the consequence 
of abuse must be proportional and therefore must not go farther than is necessary in order to 
ensure the correct levy of corporate income taxation. Thus, the criteria to combat such 





In view of the recent movements against base erosion profit shifting, a general anti-
tax abuse rule has been adopted as part of the Anti Tax Avoidance Directive and will enter 
into force starting January 1st 2019.  
International tax neutrality, one of the main focuses of the EU’s ATA Package117, 
requires that taxation affect taxpayers business choice as little as possible, including the 
election of the place of income production118. The real issue, stemming from the relationship 
between taxation and the fundamental freedoms, at least until the harmonization of corporate 
income tax, should not be understood in terms of obstacles, but in terms of fiscal neutrality. 
In fact, time and time again have the European institutions made clear that EU law 
does not protect taxpayers who seek to pay less tax by creating situations that artificially fall 
into the scope of application of the fundamental freedoms – however, the phenomenon of tax 
evasion persists. Thus, the ATAD GAAR’s purpose it to cover loopholes left by the 
                                       
116 WEBER, Dennis, The New Common Minimum Anti-Abuse Rule in the EU Parent Subsidiary Directive: 
Background, Impact, Applicability, Purpose and Effect, Intertax, volume 44 n.º2, Kluwer Law 
International BV, 2016, p.129.  
117 Stressing, however, that the EU’s neutrality concerns began far before, gaining (political) dignity with 
the European Commission’s, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, Promoting Good Governance in Tax Matters, 28 
April 2009, COM(2009) 201 final. 
118 See SMITH, Stephen, Subsidiarity and Neutrality in European Tax Policy: Economic considerations, 
in Neutrality and Subsidiarity in Taxation, Kluwer Law International, EFS, n.º 3, 1996.  
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Corporate Tax Directives and by national GAARs – thus, to take over where special anti-
abuse rules fail119.   
This new GAAR also brought with it the opportunity to re-evaluate the conditions 
and requirements used to qualify abusive tax practices.  
As mentioned above, one of the main issues that the GAAR faces is its interpretation 
not just regarding the expressions used but also concerning the need to translate the norms in 
several idioms – which means sometimes the norms’ intentions are lost in translation. 
However, throughout the years, scholars, judges and legislators have been able to forge 
a doctrine of what entails abuse (from its beginnings in the French abus du droit and German 
bona fide to the current regime with its tests and established jurisprudence). 
Hence, attempts to diminish these abuses were undertaken world-wide120, but that 
evasion continues to be an issue that greatly reduces States’ revenue every year – be it by 
hybrid mismatches, transfer pricing violations, letter-box offices or any number of other 
arrangements. These attempts made conversations among Member States possible, which 
brought forth several anti-abuse rules, finally culminating in the ATAD’s GAAR. 
As mentioned above, the ATAD’s GAAR contains three tests that must be satisfied 
in order to conclude that an arrangement is artificial: (i) the principle purpose test; (ii) the 
conflict with object and purpose test; and (iii) the non-genuine / artificial reality test. 
Considering the principle purpose test – which is not unanimously accepted by 
doctrine - the ECJ has already determined, in non-tax-related cases, that European law 
benefits will be denied whenever the sole reason for a transaction was to benefit from this 
system121. Whereas in tax-related-cases, the ECJ has indiscriminately used this criteria122123 
                                       
119 As shown in the European Commission, Council Directive Communication laying down rules against 
tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market. Com (2016) 26 final, 
Brussels 29 January 2016. p. 9 (A general anti-abuse rule). 
120 Mostly through the lead of international institutions (more than national governments themselves). 
121 PETROVITCH, Katrina, Abuse under the Merger Directive, European Taxation, volume 50, nº 12, 
2010, p. 561. 
122 Some Authors seem to believe that a sole purpose test would be more coherent and easier to prove. 
However, how does one weigh the objectives? Some say it is necessary to compare the importance of the 
tax objectives with other objectives at stake; other, for their part believe that one needs to examine whether 
the arrangement would have taken place in the absence of fiscal reasons. 
123 Distinguishing between principal aim and sole aim and then concluding that abuse is present when the 
principle purpose is tax avoidance [though they mean evasion] in ECJ Part Service C-425/06, 21 February 
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of principal / essential purpose124. However, in clear contrast to the MD’s wording, the ECJ 
went so far as to interpret the Directive’s principle purpose test as a predominant / sole 
purpose test: 
“a merger operation based on several objectives, which may also include tax 
considerations, can constitute a valid commercial reason provided, however, that 
those considerations are not predominant in the context of the proposed 
transaction125”. 
Knowing that this issue has been subject of discussion in all the GAARs so far 
(Corporate Tax Directives), we cannot help but conclude that it must have been a deliberate 
choice. Thus, it is not necessary that the tax evasion be the sole reason for the artificial 
arrangements, suffice it be one of the main reasons/purposes (which would be much more 
onerous for the taxpayer if the burden of proving the hierarchy of purposes and establishing 
which were the main ones was not so difficult).  
Regarding the conflict between the object and purpose test, the GAAR requires the 
obtaining of a tax advantage which defeats the object or purpose of the otherwise applicable 
tax provisions. Thus, the reasons why the tax norms and directives were put in place must be 
very clear so as to, in contrast, be able to identify if the tax advantage received would defeat 
its purpose. 
Finally, the non-genuine / artificiality test, also known as the substance test, establishes 
the need for ‘valid commercial reasons’ but does not provide us with further detail as to what 
these might be. In fact, no clarification is brought as to if the valid commercial reasons must 
belong to the business itself or if the shareholders interests in the company will suffice - nor 
                                       
2008 §40 but then, a few months later, referring to sole aim test in ECJ Ampliscientifica C-162/07, 22 May 
2008, §§27 and 28. 
124 ECJ, Halifax C-255/02, §§74 and 75: “(…) it must also be apparent from a number of objective factors 
that the essential aim of the transactions concerned is to obtain a tax advantage. As the Advocate General 
observed in point 89 of his Opinion, the prohibition of abuse is not relevant where the economic activity 
carried out may have some explanation other than the mere attainment of tax advantages”. 
125 ECJ, Foggia, C-126/10, 10 November 2011, § 35. 
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do most countries provide a list of reasons that would be considered valid126127, making the 
term particularly fluid. Furthermore, and now regarding the onus of proof, it’s impossible to 
prove, without a doubt, that there are no valid economic reasons whatsoever. This because 
economic or commercial motivations are not subjected to any scrutiny from external entities 
(except in some instances of mergers and acquisitions that are supervised by Competition 
Authorities). In any case, even if it is somehow proven that there were no valid economic 
reasons for the arrangement, this does not mean that it is wholly artificial. To this we must 
add the need of a case by case analysis, seeing as many variables may be in play in trying to 
discern the substance of an arrangement128. 
Thus, if ever confronted by the Tax Administration with the inexistence of valid 
economic reasons the taxpayer has two options129: (a) try to prove that there are indeed valid 
economic reasons that motivated the arrangement in question; (b) accepting the absence of 
valid economic reasons, try to prove that the operation in no way was made to avoid taxation, 
but was rather made by a number of other reasons (family affairs, conflicts between the 
partners, imposition of such a structure because of a regulatory entity, etc.). 
As stated in AG POIARES MADURO’S Opinion of the Halifax case, in §89: “The 
prohibition of abuse, as a principle of interpretation, is no longer relevant where the 
economic activity carried out may have some explanation other than the mere attainment of 
tax advantages against tax authorities. In such circumstances, to interpret a legal provision 
as not conferring such an advantage on the basis of an unwritten general principle would 
                                       
126 Except the Netherlands, as they set out several examples in 2015 with the advent of the PSD GAAR of 
so called “minimum substance requirements” to be met. Among others they include that the management 
decisions be taken in the country of residence of the intermediary holding company; that the main bank 
account of the intermediary holding company be held in the country of residence of the aforementioned 
company; that the books be kept in the country of residence of the intermediary holding company; etc. For 
further details see LOYENS & LOEFF Netherlands implementation of the amendments to the EU Parent 
Subsidiary Directive: PSD GAAR and Anti-Hybrid Rule, Edition 106, December 2015. 
127 Some reasons that have been considered valid include empire building, entering a new market, 
optimizing efficiency, vertical integration, redirecting focus to the core business, etc. 
128 The use of the expression ‘letter-box companies’, for example, can be misleading, as illustrated in ECJ, 
Eurofood IFSC, C-341/04, 2 May 2006, seeing as from the ruling we can conclude that a ‘letter-box 
company’ is not a company lacking in office space or space, but instead a company that carries no business 
whatsoever in the territory in which its registered office is situated. Thus, a holding company for instance 
would not be considered a ‘wholly artificial arrangement’.   
129 As stated in LOBO SILVA, Filipe, As operações de reestruturação empresarial como instrumento de 
planeamento fiscal, Almedina, 2016, p.164. 
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grant an excessively broad discretion to tax authorities in deciding which of the purposes of 
a given transaction ought to be considered predominant. It would introduce a high degree of 
uncertainty regarding legitimate choices made by economic operators and would affect 
economic activities which clearly deserve protection, provided that they are, at least to some 
extent, accounted for by ordinary business aims”. 
Now, this all having been said, there seem to be obvious discrepancies between the 
GAARS laid forth in the various Directives130 (primary EU law), in the anti-abuse criteria 
created by the ECJ case-law131 (secondary EU Law), and even inconsistencies among the 
ECJ’s own rulings.  
In fact, as we can see from the amended PSD, as well as from the MD, their GAARs 
require that the arrangements be genuine – while in ECJ case-law these commercial reasons 
do not need to be the principal (or one of the principle) motives of the arrangement. 
Furthermore, both the PSD and the IRD allow for the application of national GAARs 
(unlike the MD) which causes some inconsistencies when considered together. In fact, the 
purpose of national anti-abuse legislation is to protect the national tax base, whereas the 
objective of the directives is to facilitate cross-border transactions by eliminating double 
juridical and economical taxation (and/or non-taxation)132. Thus, both objectives are 
empirically opposed seeing as facilitating cross-border flows of income usually involves 
lowering taxation and therefore resulting in loss of income for the Member State. 
The EU GAAR, on its part, cannot have as main objective that of avoiding the loss of 
revenue for its Member States. Its goal is (and must remain) that of preventing abuse in the 
European Union. 
The national GAARS may be stricter, more efficient and impose more limitations on 
the erosion of the tax base, however, once they operate in cross-border transactions where 
                                       
130 Which require the tax to be the principal (or one of the principal) purposes for the transaction. 
131 Such as in Cadbury Schweppes, Thin Cap Group Litigation and Glaxo Wellcome, which hold that a 
genuine and not-negligible exercise of fundamental freedoms have priority over tax evasion. 
132 VANISTENDAEL, FRANS. Chapter 29: Can EU Tax Law Accommodate a Uniform Anti-Avoidance 
Concept?, Practical Problems in European International Tax Law: Essays in Honour of Manfred Mössner, 
online book IBFD, 2016. 
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fundamental freedoms are in play, the question metamorphoses from ‘is there abuse in 
accordance to national tax law’ to ‘ is there abuse of the fundamental freedoms’. 
Hence, hopefully this dissertation has brought some clarity on the discrepancies, 
issues and requirements that need to be met concerning the soon to be in force ATAD GAAR 
and its relation to the ECJ case law. It will be essential for Member States to enforce the 
provisions both in intra-community transactions and in operations concerning third parties, 
as well as coordinate with other Member States’ tax authorities to look out for new forms of 
abuse that may emerge.
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